














Abstract: Legal language, as a language for special purposes, contains terms or concepts 
that are peculiar to that language because of the history and cultural development of the 
legal system to which that language pertains. This means that there are terms that can 
only be understood (or have meaning) in the context of that legal culture and language.  
Furthermore, a legal term or concept in one language may not have a corresponding term 
(or referent) in another language. Thus, legal concepts or terms have a particular meaning 
to readers of a particular legal culture, as well as having a referential function, in that they 
denote a certain legal concept or notion that has developed in that culture, which 
emphasizes the specialized nature of the relevant legal language.  For this reason, scholars 
have defined legal terms as “cultural items”. Legal translators are faced with the 
asymmetry of legal systems and the resulting incongruity of legal concepts and terms.  
This problem arises as legal terms are embedded in the legal culture in which they have 
developed. Many scholars now assert that a detailed knowledge of both source and target 
legal terminology and cultures is essential when translating legal texts. As a key to 
obtaining the required knowledge that such an approach demands, this paper will explore 
the possibility that legal concepts and terms are able to be viewed or treated as if they 
were proper names, as they have a specific meaning and a referential function to a specific 
concept, in a given legal language or culture.  This possibility emerges from a re-evalution 
of the definition of proper names that has been undertaken in recent times. From this re-
evaluation a theory has emerged that posits that words or expressions previously not 
considered as proper names, can now potentially be viewed as such.   
With particular regard to the concepts of sense and reference, I will apply this 






Studies of legal translation tend to focus on the notions of language and culture, 
namely, that the development of legal language is inextricably linked to the legal 
culture in which that language has developed. Therefore, legal terms can only be 
understood by those familiar with the legal culture to which they belong. For this 
reason, scholars have described legal terms as “cultural items” (cf. Viezzi 1996, 
Salmon Kovarski 2002). This cultural aspect is one of the main reasons why legal 
translation is considered as distinct from the translation of other text genres. It is 
no more evident than in an international context (such as European Union 
legislation and treaties), where translators must bridge the legal and cultural 
divide without compromising the legal effect of the document in question. In these 
situations, all language versions of the one document are deemed to have the same 
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legal status, that is, no language version is inferior to another. In assessing legal 
translation strategies, scholars assert that a detailed knowledge of both source and 
target legal terminology and cultures is essential (cf. Chromá 2008). Recent 
scholarship suggests that the quest for “equivalence” in legal translation should be 
abandoned since there cannot be absolute correspondence or equivalence of legal terms 
across different legal systems. Sandrini (1996: 346-347) in particular advocates: 
 
Legal concepts are embedded in a specific working environment and in national legal 
systems [...] each national setting has its own principles for the application of concepts […] 
There cannot be absolute equivalence, unless it is a consequence of complete identity of 
moral values, legal provisions, interpretation rules and forms of application of laws. 
 
This requires a more comparative approach whereby the translator acquires a 
thorough and complete knowledge about terms and concepts used in both source 
and target legal systems.  He goes on to say: 
 
Only after having described the purpose of the single concepts as components of a national 
legal solution can we move on to see if there are possible connections to concepts of the 
other national legal systems. 
 
In order to achieve the required appreciation of source and target legal cultures, it 
will be demonstrated how legal terms can be viewed as if they were proper names 
and, as a consequence, the strategies developed in relation to the translation of 
proper names can be applied to legal translation. The relevance of proper names to 
legal terms arises as a result of the reassessment of the traditional definition of 
proper names that has occurred in recent times. In particular, scholars now believe 
proper names have a specialized meaning derived from the culture in which they 
have developed. This does not necessarily mean that the label of “proper name”, as 
traditionally defined by scholars, is to be applied to legal terms. Rather, the point 
must be emphasised that it will be proposed in this paper that legal terms may be 
viewed or treated as if they were “proper names” for the purpose of their 
translation. By doing so, it is hoped that, by identifying what strategies have been 
applied by translators to proper names, this can give an insight into how 
translators overcome terminological and cultural difficulties in drafting different 
language versions of the same legal text. With particular regard to the concepts of 
sense and reference, I will apply this hypothesis to a corpus of documents 




2. Proper names vs. common nouns 
 
The traditional distinction between proper names and common nouns centred on 
the notion that proper names are definite, which means they refer to a unique 
object insofar as the speaker and listener are concerned (Fromkin, Rodman, Collins 
& Blair 1984). Conversely, common nouns are universal or general terms: they do 
not themselves denote individual substances (Lyons 1969). However, the 
distinction between proper names and common nouns is not always clear-cut 




(Lyons 1977). Is it possible, then, to distinguish proper names from common 
nouns? 
In accordance with the theory developed by Allerton (1987) and Van 
Langendonck (2007), not only names of places, persons or institutions can be 
classified as proper names. This proposal presupposes that proper names possess 
special properties compared with common nouns and common noun phrases. 
These properties may be in part grammatical, a matter of what syntactic and 
morphological patterns the names use for referring to their referents, and in part 
semantic, a matter of what referents the names refer to and in what sense they 
refer to them (Allerton 1987). For example, the United States consists of three 
words, none of which can be substituted in any way without the meaning being 
destroyed: the cannot be replaced with other determiners some, or my; 
substituting United for federated or independent changes the nature of the whole 
phrase, as does replacing States with countries or provinces. Therefore, the internal 
structure of the United States is not that of a regularly generated syntactic unit, but 
much more like a lexical unit (Allerton 1987). Allerton also cites the example of the 
black market. The adjective ‘black’ here has a specialized meaning and is not 
subject to the usual pre-modification with pitch or jet. There is a fixed 
morphological pattern here.  
Van Langendonck (2007: 249) develops further the concept of what may be 
classified as a proper name. In his view: 
 
Nouns functioning as terminological items, mass nouns and clauses can be construed 
as proper names in a limited number of constructions [...] Terms for notions, concepts 
and the like may figure in apposition, or in sentences in which these words function as 
subjects and the categorical term is in a predicative position. It seems only then that 
they are to be viewed as proper names. Semantically, the words in these constructions 
are focussed on as specific, unique entities with an ad hoc reference. 
 
In the sentence “English is a widespread language”, ‘English’ has no definite article, 
and therefore functions as a proper name, as in this particular construction it is 
incapable of morphological modification (Van Langendonck 2007). Van 
Langendonck also cites the use of abstract mass nouns in constructions such as 
“the notion of liberty”. Here too, modification is impossible with the use of either 
an article or other determiner (‘some liberty’, ‘a liberty’). Särkkä (2007: 2) argues 
that there is a further category of proper name which he describes as “converted 
common nouns”. These “have all the distinguishing features of proper nouns: 
Luonnontieteellinen keskusmuseo (‘Finnish Museum of National History’), 
Kansallisarkisto (‘Finnish National Archives’), Torisilta (‘Market Bridge’).” They do 
not possess the usual characteristics of proper names. Särkkä defines them (2007: 
2) as “descriptive proper nouns”. Therefore, names which at first glance appear to 
be common nouns, or that are traditionally considered as such, can have the 








3. Sense and reference of proper names 
 
It is argued here that one of the characteristics of proper names is that they have a 
unique referent. Marmaridou (1989) notes that the referential use of a proper 
name involves the formation of encyclopaedic assumptions about a referent, based 
on the retrieval of information associated with it in memory, so that the use of this 
name can achieve optimal relevance in communication and identify a referent. This 
leads to the question as to whether the proper name has some kind of meaning 
consisting of the encyclopaedic information which contributes to its relevance. 
Salmon Kovarksi (2002: 83) asserts that “proper names […] are meaningful 
linguistic items”. The concept of meaning had been used by scholars 
interchangeably with ‘sense’ (Lyons 1977). The distinction, though, is an important 
one to make. 
The explanations of reference and sense proposed by Lyons (1969; 1977) seem 
useful in the context of the discussion at hand. Lyons regards the sense of a word 
or expression to mean its place in a system of relationships with other words in the 
vocabulary. Reference, on the other hand, is where the word or expression in 
question has been uttered with a particular communicative force in some 
appropriate context of use (i.e. it has a referent). Two expressions may refer to the 
same individual but not have the same meaning. The example cited by Lyons 
(1977) is: ‘the victor at Jena’ and ‘the loser at Waterloo’, both of which may be used 
to refer to Napoleon, but each has a different meaning as they denote different 
circumstances, in particular, different battles.  This element of meaning is often 
termed sense. Unicorns and hobbits have sense but no reference (in the real world), 
as these expressions have a meaning for speakers (Fromkin et. al. 2009).   
This provides an interesting comparison with the view expounded by 
Marmaridou (1989) with regard to proper names. She suggests that they may 
serve different purposes in communication. They are either used to identify 
referents or to convey implications about some other object the speaker has in 
mind. Proper names facilitate communication more than common nouns and 
definite descriptions could do, in that they offer shortcuts for identifying referents. 
They also function as metaphors, offering shortcuts for whole ideas and thoughts, 
which emphasizes their role as a more efficient and economical means of 
communication. Based on these assertions, proper names have two functions. The 
first is a referential function, which involves the identification of an individual in 
terms of encyclopaedic information that interlocutors mutually share and which is 
retrievable and creates the context in which the name achieves optimal relevance 
in communication, e.g. Cicero denounced Catiline in the Senate. The second function 
of a proper name is connotative. Connotations of proper names usually develop the 
cultural or historical significance that the entity bearing the name might have 
acquired at some point in the life of a group of people. This implies that initially 
there was probably an entity bearing this name as a means of identifying it as a 
referent. It also implies that there is a specific chunk of encyclopaedic information 
about this entity which has cultural or historical significance that all members of a 
group of people share and in terms of which they may use this name connotatively, 
e.g. He is no Cicero (Marmaridou 1989). As proposed by Viezzi (2004: 28): 
 




Ancora, i nomi propri sono significativi in quanto servono da indicatori con 
riferimento alla sfera sociale, etnica, affettiva, culturale e pragmatica [...] Attribuiti 
secondo consuetudine e per convenzione (o, al contrario, in deliberata violazione di 
consuetudini e convenzioni) e interpretati di conseguenza, i nomi propri sono quindi 
in grado di fornire una serie di informazioni o, quanto meno, appaiono connotati (e, 
come si vedrà, è la stessa forma del nome a costituire la base delle connotazioni); i 
nomi propri si prestano dunque a supposizioni e inferenze (ragionevolmente 
probabili, anche se non necessariamente corrette) che rispondono ad aspettative 
determinate dall’esperienza o dalla conoscenza.1  
 
Proper names are therefore cultural indicators, as Salmon Kovarski (2002) 
suggests.  They have a specialized sense, an inherent meaning that is derived from 
the culture in which they have developed. They can take on a specific 
semantic/semiotic value, giving rise to antonomasia, pseudonyms, nicknames, 
puns, jokes etc. These are not readily identified without appropriate knowledge of 
the target culture. People born and bred within a given culture automatically 
acquire the ability to manage information concerning the use of proper names in 
their own linguistic system. In light of the observations of numerous scholars with 
regard to proper names, is it possible that legal terms can also be viewed as proper 
names in certain circumstances? 
 
 
4. Legal terms viewed as proper names 
 
Many scholars have made observations with regard to legal terms being culture-
bound. Tessuto (2008) notes that legal concepts are intrinsically bound up with 
the national legal systems and principles in which they are formulated. Chromá 
(2008) notes that legal terminology consists primarily of abstract terms deeply 
and firmly rooted in domestic culture and intellectual tradition. It can be argued, 
therefore, that, just like proper names, legal terms have a ‘meaning’ determined by 
the legal culture in which they have developed. They are thus “cultural items” (cf. 
Viezzi 1996). The category of “cultural items” is not a fixed one.  This label has also 
been applied to proper names, in that an understanding of their meaning can only 
be gained by acquiring the appropriate knowledge of the culture in which they 
have been developed (cf. Salmon Kovarski 2002). This appears to reflect the same 
approach to legal translation that scholars such as Sandrini (1996) and Pommer 
(2008) have advocated, in that translator acquires a good knowledge of the sense 
and the function of particular legal terms in the source language before 
undertaking their translation as there cannot be absolute correspondence or 
equivalence of legal terms across different legal systems. The translation of proper 
names presents peculiar difficulties, often linked to their inherent meaning 
acquired in a given language or culture, hence their consideration as “cultural 
                                                          
1
 “Further, proper names are significant in that they serve as indicators with reference to a social, ethnic, 
emotional, cultural and pragmatic sphere […] Attributed according to custom and by convention (or, on 
the contrary, in direct violation of customs and conventions), and as a consequence so interpreted, proper 
names are therefore able to provide a series of information or, at least, they appear connoted (and, as will 
be seen, it is the form of the name itself that forms the basis for the connotation); proper names therefore 
lend themselves to supposition and inference (reasonably probable, even if not necessarily correct) which 
respond to expectations determined by experience or knowledge.” 
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items” (cf. Salmon Kovarski 2002).  In light of this expanded theory of proper 
names, it is proposed that legal terms be treated as if they were proper names for 
the purposes of their translation. That is, approaches used by translators with 
regard to proper names can also be applied to legal terms. In other words, if legal 
terms can be viewed as proper names, then identifying what strategies have been 
applied by translators to proper names can give an insight into how translators 
overcome terminological and cultural difficulties in drafting different language 
versions of the same legal text so as to achieve the required appreciation of source 
and target legal cultures that scholars now advocate as being an essential 
requirement in undertaking legal translation.  
Furthermore, in light of the theories developed by Allerton (1987) and Van 
Langendonck (2007), who suggest that abstract concepts and notions can be 
classified as proper names in particular circumstances, is it possible that legal 
terms can also be viewed or treated as if they were proper names? It seems 
obvious that the names of institutions can be considered proper names. The 
hypotheses developed by Allerton (1987) and Särkkä (2007) would appear to 
confirm this. It is also useful to consider the observations of Sacco (1994) who 
makes a distinction between abstract notions, such as contratto (‘contract’), 
volontà (‘will’), danno (‘damage’) and other words that: 
 
sembrano indicare categorie assai ampie, e acquistano invece, proprio nei rapporti 
interlinguistici, un significato strettamente legato all’ambiente d’origine o ad altre 
circostanze; in casi limite, diventano una sorta di nome proprio, riservato ad una sola 
persona. 
In quel settore del diritto pubblico che si riferisce ai titoli onorifici, noi c’imbattiamo 
spesso in contrapposizioni nominalistiche che nessuna contrapposizione concettuale 
può spiegare (conte ≠ marchese; cavaliere ≠ commendatore; licencié ≠ maître ≠ 
docteur). L’equivalenza rispetto ai termini corrispondenti al latino medioevale, o il 
valore storico di queste parole, ha permesso a queste contrapposizioni di mettere 
radici in un numero elevato di lingue.2 
 
Sacco appears to argue that certain legal terms can be viewed as if they were 
proper names, as they are inextricably linked to the culture in which they have 
developed (specialized sense) and have a unique reference to a particular social or 
cultural sphere. So as to better understand the relevance of the concepts of sense 
and reference to legal translation, let us see how they can be applied to the three 
potentially problematic translations of legal institutions as discussed by Fiorito 
(2004). 
 
                                                          
2 “appear to indicate extremely broad categories and instead acquire, precisely in their 
interlinguistic relations, a meaning that is closely tied to the environment in which they originated 
or to other circumstances; in limited cases, they become a proper name of sorts, referring only to 
one person. 
In that sector of public law that refers to honorary titles, we often come up against 
nominalistic contrasts that no conceptual contrast can explain (conte ≠ marchese; cavaliere ≠ 
commendatore; licencié ≠ maître ≠ docteur). Equivalence with respect to medieval Latin terms, or 
the historical value of these words, has allowed these contrasts to lay roots in a large number of 
languages.” 




1. Where at the lexical level the terms appear to correspond, yet their legal 
meaning is different in the respective languages. The examples cited here 
are notaio and notary. These can be treated as proper names according to 
Sacco’s (1994) definition, particularly where the term is used with 
reference to the concept of a ‘notary’, that is, a person who plays a 
particular role in the legal system which has a specific or unique function or 
purpose. Notaio and notary have a different sense in English and Italian. A 
notaio means one thing to an Italian speaker (a lawyer who drafts contracts 
and wills, as well as authenticating them as original copies), and notary an 
altogether different thing to an English speaker (one who simply certifies 
documents, similar to a justice of the peace), because of the diverse 
functions they perform.  
 
2. Where the term is different at both a lexical and legal level. In such 
situations it may be that a direct translation of such a term does not 
correspond to any legal concept in the target language. The Italian Corte 
Suprema di Cassazione is often rendered in English as ‘the Supreme Court of 
Cassation’. But what sense does this have to an English speaker? Often a 
qualifying sentence will be added along the lines of ‘Italy’s Highest Court’ to 
assist the target reader, as in the English legal system there is no ‘Supreme 
Court of Cassation’. 
 
3. Where a legal term or institution does not exist in the country of the target 
language. Barrister can be treated as a proper name according to Sacco’s 
(1994) theory for the same reason that notaio or notary can be so classified. 
How then would a translator convey the meaning of barrister in Italian, 
when in Italy there is no such thing as a lawyer who specializes in arguing 
cases in court, that is, there is no referent?   
 
 
5. Translation of proper names  
 
Various strategies have been developed for the translation of proper names. These 
include:  
 
1. Repetition, which entails the reproduction of the proper name in its original 
form in the target text, for example, British Commonwealth → British 
Commonwealth (cf. Viezzi 2004; Särkkä 2007). 
 
2. Orthografic adaptation, which is manifested in the introduction of minor 
spelling modifications for phonetic or alphabetical reasons, for example, 
Gaddafi → Gheddafi (cf. Salmon Kovarski 1997).   
 
3. Terminological adaptation, that is, the formal transformation of proper 
names where there exists a conventional translation in the target language, 




4. Linguistic translation or calque, that is, transferring either wholly or 
partially, the semantic content of the proper name, for example The White 
House → la Casa Bianca (cf. Taylor 1998; Viezzi 2004). 
 
5. Naturalization, that is, the substitution of the proper name in the source text 
with that which has a referent in the target culture, for example United 
States of America → España (cf. Viezzi 2004). 
 
6. Extratextual gloss, such as a footnote or some type of notation in the target 
text (Viezzi 2004). 
 
7. Intratextual gloss, that is, some form of explanation in the target text (cf. 
Marello 1989; Viezzi 2004; Särkkä 2007). 
 
8. Neutralization, that is, adopting a term in the target text that has no relation 
to a reality in the target culture (cf. Šarčević 1997; Cosmai 2003; Viezzi 
2004). 
 
The choice between the various alternatives will be determined by pragmatic 
factors, paramount among which are the overarching purpose of the text and the 




6. Application of hypothesis: examples of the translation in the Agreements 
 
The corpus the subject of analysis consists of 11 agreements; the first was signed 
in 1963 and the last in 1996.  They are:  
 
 Agreement relating to air services/Accordo relativo ai servizi aerei (1963); 
 
 Migration and settlement agreement/Accordo di emigrazione e stabilimento 
(1971); 
 
 Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation of income derived from 
international air transport/Accordo per evitare la doppia imposizione sui 
redditi derivanti dall'esercizio del trasporto aereo internazionale (1972). 
 
 Agreement of cultural co-operation/Accordo di cooperazione culturale 
(1975); 
 
 Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal 
evasion with respect to taxes on income/Convenzione per evitare le doppie 
imposizioni e prevenire le evasioni fiscali in materia di imposte sul reddito 
(1982); 
 




 Treaty on economic and commercial co-operation/Trattato di cooperazione 
in materia di economia e commercio (1984); 
 
 Treaty of extradition/Trattato di estradizione (1985); 
 
 Reciprocal agreement in the matter of health assistance/Accordo di 
reciprocita  in materia di assistenza sanitaria (1986); 
 
 Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters/Trattato di mutual 
assistenza in materia penale (1988); 
 
 Social security agreement/Accordo in materia di sicurezza sociale (1993); 
and 
 
 Films co-production agreement/Accordo di coproduzione cinematografica 
(1996). 
 
As with legal documents in other multilingual contexts, each language version of 
each Agreement has equal legal status (they are legally equivalent). The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) provides that texts of treaties in different 
languages are equally authoritative in each language.   
Using the taxonomy of strategies for the translation of proper names cited 
above, I will cite some examples of translation solutions adopted in the 
Agreements. The examples cited are set out by comparing what I believe to be the 
source text first, followed by its translation. This decision was not a simple one, but 
was based on the following criteria: naturalness of language; appropriateness of 





(1) Italian workers shall be eligible [...] to be represented in Australian courts → I 
lavoratori italiani avranno diritto [...] ad essere rappresentati davanti alla 
magistratura australiana 
The term that is the subject of analysis in (1) is Australian courts. By itself, courts 
would be identifiable as a common noun. However, when the adjective Australian is 
added, according to Allerton’s (1987) theory, it can be viewed as a proper name for 
the reason that Australian is a restrictive modifier that reflects a geographical 
reality, that the courts are located in Australia. Example (1) is problematic since in 
Australia a magistrate performs functions that are quite different to those of an 
Italian ‘magistrato’. An Italian ‘magistrato’ has investigative powers; an Australian 
magistrate has no such powers (Certoma 1985; Marantelli & Tikotin 1985). 
Therefore, the translation “magistratura australiana” is a naturalization which 
reflects a diverse referent, that is, diverse legal roles in the two legal systems, 





6.2 Explicative translations 
 
(2) testimonial privilege → i diritti del testimone 
 
(3) capofamiglia → head of a family 
 
(4) Trusteeship Agreement → Accordo di Amministrazione fiduciaria 
 
It can be argued that examples (2), (3) and (4) are cultural items, in that they are 
legal terms that have developed in a particular legal culture, and, as such, have a 
specialized meaning that is derived from that culture (cf. Viezzi 1996). However, 
applying Van Langendonck’s (2007) theory, they could be treated as having the 
function of proper names, being terminological items (legal concepts) with a 
unique reference. They have the character of a mass noun dealing with a specific 
notion or concept (i.e. trusteeship). With regard to example (2), as far as I am 
aware, there is no corresponding equivalent in Italian legal language for testimonial 
privilege, a term which refers to communications that cannot be used in court as 
evidence (for example, between a doctor and patient). The Dizionario De Franchis 
(1984-1996) does not list a corresponding term in Italian. The translation chosen, 
‘i diritti del testimone’, serves as an explanation of the sense of the term for an 
Italian-speaking reader. It could be considered an illustration of the situation 
where there is no corresponding terminological equivalent (i.e. referent) in the 
legal system of the target text, with the consequence that a completely new term 
has to be created in the translated version in order to achieve uniformity between 
the two language versions.  
The translation of capofamiglia as ‘head of a family’ in (3) would also fall into 
this category, also on the basis that there is no corresponding term or concept in 
English legal language, that is, there is an absence of a corresponding referent. The 
solution adopted – “head of a family” – is of an explanatory/definitional nature, 
giving the English-speaking reader the sense of the term.  
In (4) the use of “Accordo di Amministrazione fiduciaria” for Trusteeship 
Agreement may also be considered to be a translation with an explicative function 
with reference to the concept of trusteeship, which is peculiar to the common law 
system and thus has no corresponding referent in the Italian legal system. Looking 
to the three Italian/English legal dictionaries (that I am aware of) as a point of 
comparison, Mastellone (1980) suggests “amministratore fiduciario” as a 
translation for trustee, Di Stefano and Di Fazio (1985) propose “fiduciario” and the 
De Franchis (1984-1996) suggests “proprietario fiduciario”. However, the question 
must be asked whether the chosen translation fully renders the sense of the 
concept of trusteeship to an Italian speaking reader. De Franchis (1984-1996) 





(5) Partner-related Australian benefits → Prestazioni australiane riguardanti il 
coniuge de jure o de facto 
 




(6) A document is duly authenticated for the purposes of this Treaty if […] it purports 
to be authenticated by oath or affirmation of a witness → Un documento e  ritenuto 
debitamente autenticato, ai fini di questo Trattato, se […] risulti essere autenticato 
per mezzo di giuramento o asseverazione di un testimone  
 
(7) rights to royalties and other payments in respect of the operation of mines or 
quarries or of the exploitation of any natural resource → i diritti relativi a canoni ed 
altri compensi dovuti per lo sfruttamento di miniere o cave nonche  di ogni risorsa 
naturale 
 
In these examples we see the use of an already existing word in the target 
language, attributing to it a different meaning in the translation. With reference to 
(5), the English word partner has taken on a significance which encompasses both 
married and unmarried couples. It can be viewed as having the function of a 
proper name on the basis that it refers to a terminological concept with a unique 
reference (Van Langendonck 2007) and is incapable of being modified in this 
context. It has a specialized meaning derived from the legal context in which it is 
used. 
At first glance, ‘coniuge’ would appear to be a satisfactory neutral solution, 
designed to explain to an Italian-speaking reader the sense of partner in such a 
context. However, the GRADIT (2000) defines ‘coniuge’ as: “ciascuna delle due 
persone unite in matrimonio”. Yet here it refers to both married and unmarried 
persons, thus it has the flavour of the creation of a generic term which does not 
conform to ordinary language usage in the target language (Šarčević 1997; Cosmai 
2003). ‘Compagno’ is usually used in Italian for partner in this sense: the GRADIT 
lists it as a synonym for ‘partner’, ‘concubina’ and ‘amante’. ‘Compagno’ would seem 
to be the corresponding referent, rather than ‘coniuge’, however, the use of the 
former may not have been considered appropriate by the translator given the 
nature and status of the document as a bilateral treaty. 
Of particular interest at (6) is the use of ‘asseverazione’ for affirmation. An 
affirmation is a form of sworn testimony given by a witness who is atheist or 
agnostic. It may be viewed as a proper name, being a terminological item with a 
unique meaning (Van Langendonck 2007), and cannot be pluralized (e.g. “make 
affirmations”). It also has a cultural aspect which gives it this specialized meaning. 
As with examples (2), (3) and (4) above, it is on the border between classification 
as a cultural item and a proper name.   
To accommodate non-believers, in the English and Australian legal systems a 
form of sworn testimony known as an affirmation was created, whereby the 
witness does not place his or her hand on the Bible, and does not “swear by 
Almighty God” as to the veracity of their statement, but simply “affirms” that it is 
true. With regard to the choice of ‘asseverazione’ as a translation, it is necessary to 
refer to the definition of this word.  The Zingarelli (2008) provides: 
 
(dir.) Certificazione, nei modi previsti della legge, della verita  di quanto affermato 
in una perizia, o della conformita  al testo originale di una traduzione, o della verita  




The meaning of this term relates to the certification of the veracity of an expert 
report, of a translation, or of particular facts. Thus, it may have a different referent 
in Italian legal language than that adopted in this particular Agreement. By way of 
comparison, Mastellone (1980) suggests a form of explicative definition: 
“dichiarazione solenne in sostituzione di un giuramento”, which captures the sense 
of what an affirmation is. Di Stefano and Di Fazio (1985) concur with this solution, 
proposing “dichiarazione solenne” for affirmation. The De Franchis (1984-1996) 
provides a more elaborate explanation: 
 
In senso stretto, la dichiarazione solenne consentita al teste […] nel caso in cui 
questi si rifiuti di giurare per motivi religiosi.3 
 
Interestingly, none of the three dictionaries contain a reference to ‘asseverazione’. 
The choice of ‘canoni’ to translate royalties (7) seems to differ from its use in 
ordinary language when we look to the meaning of these terms. The Treccani 
(1991) gives the following definition of ‘canone’: 
 
Prestazione in denaro o in derrate, che viene corrisposta a intervalli determinati di 
tempo quale corrispettivo del godimento di un bene, per lo più immobile, in base a un 
contratto: canone d’affitto, di locazione. 
 
Therefore a ‘canone’ in Italian means either a licence fee (as in “il canone della 
RAI”, the annual licence fee paid for Italian State Television), or rental payments 
(canone d’affitto, di locazione). The concepts of ‘royalties’ and ‘canoni’ have 
different referents. In English legal language, royalties are payments made on a 
regular basis for the right to extract minerals (generally known as mining 
royalties). For this reason, adopting Van Langendonck’s (2007) theory, it can be 
treated as if it were a proper name. It cannot be modified utilizing various 
determiners (e.g. “payment of some royalties”) and has a unique reference derived 
from the legal culture in which it developed. The corresponding Italian term is 
“diritti di sfruttamento” (Oxford-Paravia Italian English Dictionary 2001). The 
choice of ‘canoni’ here, when not normally used in Italian in the context of mining 
royalties, but to denote other types of payments, appears to be a solution of the 
generic type identified by Cosmai (2003) and Šarčević (1997), that is, applying a 
new (legal) meaning to a term which does not conform to ordinary usage in the 
target language. The De Franchis (1984-1996) would appear to confirm this by 
referring to “canone di concessione mineraria” and providing Royalty 




Recent scholarship suggests that the quest for “equivalence” in legal translation 
should be abandoned since there cannot be absolute correspondence or 
equivalence of legal terms across different legal systems.  Legal translation 
scholars now argue that a more comparative approach should be applied whereby 
                                                          
3 “Strictly speaking, a solemn declaration a witness is permitted to make in circumstances where he 
or she refuses to swear an oath on religious grounds.” 




the translator acquires a thorough and complete knowledge about terms and 
concepts used in both source and target legal systems.   
As has been documented in this paper, legal terms have a specialized meaning 
determined by the legal culture and tradition in which they have developed.  As a 
result of this cultural embeddedness, legal terms are regarded as cultural items.  In 
order to achieve the required appreciation of source and target legal cultures, this 
paper has argued that legal terms may be viewed as if they were proper names for 
the purpose of their translation.  The relevance of proper names to legal terms 
arises as a result of the reassessment of the traditional definition of proper names 
that has occurred in recent times. In particular, scholars now believe proper names 
have a specialized meaning derived from the culture in which they have developed. 
Consequently, , this paper argues that the strategies developed in relation to the 
translation of proper names can be applied to legal translation.  By doing so, 
identifying what strategies have been applied by translators to proper names can 
give an insight into how translators overcome terminological and cultural 
difficulties in drafting different language versions of the same legal text. To assist 
in this process, I suggest the application of the concepts of sense and reference as 
defined by Lyons (1969; 1977), as in many cases, the translation of a legal term 
will not be appropriate in the target language, as it does not make sense to the 
target reader or has no corresponding referent.  
The translation solutions taken from the corpus and cited in this paper seem to 
lead to the conclusion that the principal translation strategies adopted were 
chosen with the overarching purpose of guaranteeing linguistic uniformity of both 
language versions. The result of this is that the translations do not conform to 
normal language usage in the target language. Therefore, they are not able to be 
easily understood by the general public but, as is usually the case with legal 
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